

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

PBSUCCESS  
30 May 1954

2003

K-Program  
Subject: RYBAT  
Re-Assessment of Objectives

1. Depending on whether or not Lincoln reaches the conclusion that the (physical and psychological) damage inflicted by the compromise of CALLIGERIS' assets in WSBurnt can still be prepared, the objectives and methods of K - Program may have to be drastically revised. The abandonment or retrenchment of PBSUCCESS would be likely to place a somewhat greater burden upon K - Program than heretofore envisioned.

2. The following tentative conclusions should be viewed by you against the background of the limited availability of reliable data regarding CALLIGERIS' assets in this country:

A. It may become necessary to authorize a modified departure from the concept of non-attributability, once the approach to K-Program personality targets can no longer be exclusively predicated on the existence of an effective underground movement. In that case increasing stress would have to be placed upon the probability of a last resort to unilateral United States intervention.

B. In practical terms, this would mean that the individuals in question have to be told that the United States, while rendering support to the Guatemalan opposition, is by no means irrevocably committed to pursuing this particular course in an effort to dislodge international communism from Guatemala. The United States, in fairness to Guatemala and in keeping with the principles of good neighbor policy, has afforded the Guatemalan people one last opportunity to put its house in order.

C. If, on the other hand, it should turn out that the Opposition either lacks the strength or the determination to unseat the Arbenz regime, then the United States would find itself placed before an entirely new situation, calling for a drastic revision of the policy of non-intervention heretofore pursued. At the end of the road the United States would be forced to have recourse to military intervention.

*No - only in  
own people*

3. In our dealings with individuals of the calibre of [ ] SMILAX and SWALLOW, a strictly notional account of the effective strength of PBSUCCESS cannot be sustained indefinitely. Sooner or later they are bound to arrive at an independent estimate which, if it radically differs from the one imparted by PAGE, is bound to shake their faith in the United States. Thus a gradual shift from exclusive reliance upon PBSUCCESS capabilities toward an increasing emphasis upon United States intentions may become necessary in our future dealings with them.

*No - expect  
too much  
commitment  
P - for  
idea*

4. The "new look" cannot be developed in a political vacuum. While it is possible and justifiable to give PBSUCCESS a notional buildup, conveying a moderately exaggerated picture of its potentialities as an inducement to join up, the threat of ultimate United States intervention will have to be carefully concerted with our foreign policy. In other words, the proud boast that the United States will under no circumstances put up with rampant communism in Guatemala, ought to be backed by some tangible and conclusive manifestations of American resolve. Conversely, should our actions tend to prove that the United States has become reconciled to seeing Guatemala go down the communist drain, with a good prospect that other Central American nations will emulate her example, then PAGE would soon find himself in the invidious position of the Emperor in Andersen's fairy tale.

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5. Even without effective PBSuccess support, we could see some merit in continuing K-Program, at least until it can be conclusively determined whether or not the Army High Command, faced by a threat of military intervention, would be willing to take the initiative in overthrowing the Arbenz regime. The success of this scheme would essentially hinge on a firm United States policy decision which it would be comparatively simple to ~~the Minister of National Defense~~ impart to the Minister of National Defense, Colonel SANCHEZ. His reaction to the contingency of direct United States intervention would, if we accept ~~the~~ analysis of the situation, have a decisive bearing on the Army's attitude.

6. Once we are forced to abandon all hopes of applying our main leverage in the garrisons and everything is staked upon winning over the Army High Command, then our thesis that a sufficiently realistic threat will goad the Army into taking prophylactic action will have to be put to the test. Given that constellation, some comfort could be derived from the fact that in an attempt at defecting Colonels ~~the~~ and ~~the~~, the issue of CALLIGERIS' political aspirations will no longer loom large. An admittedly unsatisfactory solution, involving our countenancing a military dictatorship, would at least constitute some improvement over the ARBENZ regime and would save us the price of attributable military intervention and all that entails. This is a contingency you will have to face up to if PBSuccess has suffered a material setback.

7. You will appreciate that in a rapidly developing situation ~~it~~ it will not always be possible to serve you advance notice of strategic detours forced upon us by circumstances beyond our control. This despatch will serve to acquaint you with the ~~essential~~ elements of an alternate frame of reference. Pending further conclusive indications regarding the future of PBSuccess, we shall proceed along lines laid down in previous memoranda. There has been no major change in our plans to develop ~~the~~ and SWALLOW and to approach SMILAX. As an ultimate objective we may have to set ourselves the defection of Colonel ~~the~~ an attempt which would require powerful backing on the highest policymaking level of the United States Government.

Graham L Page

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